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        ABSTRACT 
Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books with interest, I 
was expecting some more insights into behavior.  Sadly he makes the dead hands of group 
selection and phenomenology into the centerpieces of his theories of behavior, and this 
largely invalidates the work.  Worse, since he shows such bad judgement here, it calls into 
question all his previous work. The attempt to resurrect group selection by his friends at 
Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a few years ago was one of the major scandals in biology in the 
last decade, and I have recounted the sad story in my article ‘Altruism, Jesus and the End of 
the World—how the Templeton Foundation bought a Harvard Professorship and attacked 
Evolution, Rationality and Civilization -- A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social Conquest of 
Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012).’  Unlike Nowak, Gintis 
does not seem to be motivated by religious fanaticism, but by the strong desire to generate 
an alternative to the grim realities of human nature, made easy by the (near universal) lack 
of understanding of basic human biology and blank slateism of behavioral scientists, other 
academics, and the general public.  
 
Gintis rightly attacks (as he has many times before) economists, sociologists and other 
behavioral scientists for not having a coherent framework to describe behavior.  Of course 
the framework needed to understand behavior is an evolutionary one.  Unfortunately he 
fails to provide one himself (according to his many critics and I concur), and the attempt to 
graft the rotten corpse of group selection onto whatever economic and psychological 
theories he has generated in his decades of work, merely invalidates his entire project.  
Although Gintis makes a valiant effort to understand and explain the genetics, like Wilson 
and Nowak, he is far from an expert, and like them, the math just blinds him to the biological 
impossibilities and of course this is the norm in science.  As Wittgenstein famously noted on 
the first page of Culture and Value “There is no religious denomination in which the misuse 
of metaphysical expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.”  
 
It has always been crystal clear that a gene that causes behavior which decreases its own 
frequency cannot persist, but this is the core of the notion of group selection. Furthermore, 
it has been well known and often demonstrated that group selection just reduces to 
inclusive fitness (kin selection), which, as Dawkins has noted, is just another name for 
evolution by natural selection. Like Wilson, Gintis has worked in this arena for about 50 
years and still has not grasped it, but after the scandal broke, it took me only 3 days to find, 
read and understand the most relevant professional work, as detailed in my article. It is mind 
boggling to realize that Gintis and Wilson were unable to accomplish this in nearly half a 
century.  
I discuss the errors of group selection and phenomenology that are the norm in academia as 
special cases of the near universal failure to understand human nature that are destroying 
America and the world.  
 
Those who wish to read all my articles please consult the ebook here Philosophy, Human 
Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 by  Michael Starks 
662p (2016) 
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 In the years after the Nowak, Wilson, Tarnita paper was published in Nature, several 
population geneticists recounted chapter and verse on the subject, again showing 
conclusively that it is all a storm in a teacup. It is most unfortunate that Gintis, like his 
friends, failed to ask a competent biologist about this and regards as misguided the 140 
some well known biologists who a signed a letter protesting the publication of this nonsense 
in Nature. I refer those who want the gory details to my paper, as it’s the best account of the 
melee that I am aware of.  For a summary of the tech details see Dawkins Article The 
Descent of Edward Wilson http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/edward-wilson-
social-conquest-earth-evolutionary-errors-origin-species.  As Dawkins wrote ‘For Wilson not 
to acknowledge that he speaks for himself against the great majority of his professional colleagues 
is—it pains me to say this of a lifelong hero —an act of wanton arrogance’.  Sadly Gintis has 
assimilated himself to such inglorious company. There are also some nice Dawkins youtubes such as 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBweDk4ZzZ4.   
 
Gintis has also failed to provide the behavioral framework lacking in all the social sciences. One 
needs to have a logical structure for rationality, an understanding of the two systems of 
thought (dual process theory), of the division between scientific issues of fact and philosophical 
issues of how language works in the context at issue, and of how to avoid reductionism and 
scientism, but he, like nearly all students of behavior, is largely clueless.  He, like them, is 
enchanted by models, theories, and concepts, and the urge to explain, while Wittgenstein 
showed us that we only need to describe, and that theories, concepts etc., are just ways of 
using language (language games) which have value only insofar as they have a clear test (clear 
truthmakers, or as eminent philosopher John Searle likes to say, clear Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS)). I have attempted to provide a start on this in my recent writings, such as The Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (behavior, personality, rationality, higher order thought, 
intentionality) (2016) and The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language 
as Revealed in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle (2016). Those interested in 
all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature 
and the Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p (2016).  I will now give a 
brief presentation of this framework.  Since I have explained this table and its use in describing 
behavior in great detail in many recent papers and several books, available on this site and 
others, I will not repeat it here. 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness (intentionality, behavior) is now the 
hottest topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and from the 50’s to 
the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, 
Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The 
rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes 
and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of 
Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-
Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality 
(LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of 
Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of 
the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very 
recent writings. 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by Searle, 
and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human Nature by 
P.M.S Hacker.  The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. 
Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no 
gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2  and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes  
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
 
Yes 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
No 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Describe a Mental State No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary Priority 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary Content Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary Initiation Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place(H+N,T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily Expressions Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self Contradictions No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/Rule Based RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/Analytic A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or 
meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others ( or COS1 by myself). 
*           Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***       Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****  Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this causally self- referential. 
*******Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 
volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after 
we have described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation 
(i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one 
philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, 
and hence only one solution— showing the correct context. 
Gintis starts making dubious, vague or downright bizarre claims early in the book. It begins on 
the first page of the overview with meaningless quotes from Einstein and Ryle. On pxii the 
paragraph beginning ‘Third Theme’ about entangled minds needs rewriting to specify that 
language games are functions of System 2 and that’s how thinking, believing etc. work (what 
they are), while the Fourth Theme which tries to explain behavior as due to what people 
‘consciously believe’ is right.  That is, with ‘nonconsequentialism’ he’s trying to ‘explain’  
behavior as ‘altruistic’ group selection mediated by conscious linguistic System 2.  But if we take 
an evolutionary long term view, it’s clearly due to reciprocal altruism, attempting to serve  
inclusive fitness, which is mediated by the unconscious operation of System 1.  Likewise for the 
Fifth Theme and the rest of the Overview. He favors Rational Choice but has no idea this is a 
language game for which the exact context must be specified, nor that both System 1 and 
System 2 are ‘rational’ but in quite different ways. This is the classic error of most descriptions 
of behavior, which Searle has called The Phenomenological Illusion, Pinker the Blank Slate and 
Tooby and Cosmides ‘The Standard Social Science Model’) and I have discussed it extensively in 
my other reviews and articles. As long as one does not grasp that most of our behavior is 
automated by nonlinguistic System 1, and that our conscious linguistic System 2 is mostly for 
rationalization of our compulsive and unconscious choices, it is not possible to have more than 
a very superficial view of behavior, i.e., the one that is nearly universal not only among 
academics but politicians, billionaire owners of high tech companies, movie stars and the 
general public. Consequently, the consequences reach far beyond academia, producing 
delusional social policies that are bringing about the inexorable collapse of industrial 
civilization. See my ‘Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the World’.  It is 
breathtaking to see America and the European democracies helping citizens of the third world 
destroy everyone’s future.  
On pxiii one can describe the ‘nonconsequentialist’ (i.e., apparently ‘true’ altruistic or self-
destructive behavior) as actually performing reciprocal altruism, serving inclusive fitness due to 
genes evolved in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., that of our very 
distant ancestors), which stimulates the dopaminergic circuits in the ventral tegmentum and 
the nucleus accumbens, with the resulting release of dopamine which makes us feel good—the 
same mechanism that appears to be involved in all addictive behavior from drug abuse to 
soccer moms.  
And more incoherent babble such as “In the context of such environments, there is a fitness 
benefit to the ‘epigenetic transmission’ of such ‘information’ concerning the ‘current state’ of 
the ‘environment’, i.e., transmission through non genetic ‘channels’. This is called ‘cultural 
transmission’” [scare quotes mine].  Also that ‘culture’ is ‘directly encoded’ in the brain (p7), 
which he says is the main tenet of gene-culture coevolution, and that democratic institutions 
and voting are altruistic and cannot be explained in terms of self-interest (p17-18). The major 
reason for these peculiar views does not really come out until p186 when he finally makes it 
clear that he is a group selectionist.  Since there is no such thing as group selection apart from 
inclusive fitness, it’s no surprise that this is just another incoherent account of behavior—i.e., 
more or less what Tooby and Cosmides famously termed The Standard Social Science Model.   
What he calls ‘altruistic genes’ on p188 should be called ‘inclusive fitness genes’ or ‘kin 
selection genes’.  Gintis is also much impressed with the idea of gene-culture coevolution, 
which only means that culture may itself be an agent of natural selection but he fails to grasp 
that this can only happen within the context of natural selection (inclusive fitness).  Like nearly 
all social scientists (and scientists, philosophers etc.), it never crosses his mind that ‘culture’, 
‘coevolution’,’ symbolic’,’ ‘epigenetic’, ‘information’, ‘representation’ etc., are all families of 
complex language games, whose COS (Conditions Of Satisfaction, tests for truth) are exquisitely 
sensitive to context. Without a specific context they don’t mean anything. So in this book, as in 
most of the literature on behavior, there is much talk that has the appearance of sense without 
sense (meaning or clear COS).  
His claim on pxv, that most of our genes are the result of culture, is clearly preposterous as e.g., 
it is well known that we are about 98% chimpanzee.  Only if he means those relating to 
language can we accept the possibility that some of our genes have been subject to cultural 
selection and even these merely modified ones that already existed—i.e., a few base pairs were 
changed out of hundreds of thousands or millions in each gene.  
He is much taken with the ‘rational actor’ model of economic behavior. but again is unaware 
that the automaticities of S1 underlie all ‘rational’ behavior and the conscious linguistic 
deliberations of S2 cannot take place without them.  Like many, perhaps the vast majority of 
current younger students of behavior, I see all human activities as easily comprehensible results 
of the working of selfish genetics in a contemporary context in which police surveillance and a 
temporary abundance of resources gotten by raping the earth and robbing our own 
descendants leads to relative temporary tranquility.  In this connection I suggest my review of 
Pinker’s recent book—The Transient Suppression of the Worst Devils of Our Nature—A Review 
of The Better Angels of Our Nature’.  Many behaviors look like true altruism, and some are (i.e., 
they will decrease the frequency of the genes that bring them about – i.e, lead to the extinction 
of their own descendants), but the point which Gintis misses is that these are due to a 
psychology which evolved long ago in small groups on the African plains in the EEA and made 
sense then (i.e., it was inclusive fitness, when everyone in our group of a few dozen to a few 
hundred were our close relatives), and so we often continue with these behaviors even though 
they no longer make sense (i.e., they serve the interests of unrelated or distantly related 
persons which decreases our genetic fitness by decreasing the frequency of the genes that 
made it possible).  This accounts for his promoting the notion that many behaviors are ‘truly 
altruistic’, rather than selfish in origin (such as in sect. 3.2). He even notes this and calls it 
‘distributed effectivity’ (p60-63) in which people behave in big elections as though they were 
small ones, but he fails to see this is not due to any genes for ‘true altruism’ but to genes for 
reciprocal altruism (inclusive fitness), which is of course selfish. Thus people behave as though 
their actions (e.g,, their votes) were consequential, even though it is clear that they are not.  
E.g., one can find on the net that the chances of any one person’s vote deciding the outcome of 
an American presidential election is in the range of millions to tens of millions to one. And of 
course the same is true of our chances of winning a lottery, yet our malfunctioning EEA 
psychology makes lotteries and voting hugely popular activities.  
He also seems unaware of the standard terminology and ways of describing behavior used in 
evolutionary psychology (EP).  E.g., on pg. 75 Arrow’s description of norms of social behavior 
are described in economic terms rather than as EP from the EEA trying to operate in current 
environments, and at the bottom of the page, people act not as ‘altruistic’ punishers (i.e., as 
‘group selectionists’) but as inclusive fitness punishers.  On p 78, to say that subjects act 
‘morally’ or in accord with a norm ‘for its own sake’, is again to embrace the group 
selectionist/phenomenological illusion, and clearly it is groups of genes that are trying to 
increase their inclusive fitness via well-known EP mechanisms like cheater detection and 
punishment. Again on p88, what he describes as other-regarding unselfish actions can just as 
easily be described as self-regarding attempts at reciprocal altruism which go astray in a large 
society.  
Naturally, he often uses standard economics jargon such as ‘the subjective prior must be 
interpreted as a conditional probability’, which just means a belief in the likelihood of a 
particular outcome (p90-91), and ‘common subjective priors’ (shared beliefs) p122. Much of the 
book and of behavior concerns what is often called ‘we intentionality’ or the construction of 
social reality, but the most eminent theorist in this arena, John Searle, is not discussed, his now 
standard terminology such as COS and DIRA (desire independent reasons for action) does not 
appear, he is not in the index, and only one of his many works, and that over 20 years old, is 
found in the bibliography.  
On p97 he comments favorably on Bayesian updating without mentioning that it is notorious 
for lacking any meaningful test for success (i.e., clear COS), and commonly fails to make any 
clear predictions, so that no matter what people do, it can describe their behavior after the 
fact.  
However, the main problem with chapter 5 is that ‘rational’ and other terms are complex 
language games that have no meaning apart from very specific contexts, which are typically 
lacking here. Of course, as Wittgenstein showed us, this is the core problem of all discussion of 
behavior and Gintis has most of the behavioral science community (or at least most of those 
over 40) as coconspirators. Likewise throughout the book, such as chapter 6, where he 
discusses ‘complexity theory’, ‘emergent properties’, ‘macro and micro levels’, and ‘nonlinear 
dynamical systems’ and the generation of ‘models’ (which can mean almost anything and 
‘describe’ almost anything), but it’s only prediction that counts (i.e., clear COS).  
In spite of his phenomenological illusion (i.e., the near universal assumption that our conscious 
deliberations describe and control behavior—at odds with almost all the research in social 
psychology for the last 40 years), he also shares the reductionist delusion, wondering why the 
social sciences have not got a core analytical theory and have not coalesced. This of course is a 
frequent subject in the social sciences and philosophy and the reason is that psychology of 
higher order thought is not describable by causes, but by reasons, and one cannot make 
psychology disappear into physiology nor physiology into biochemistry nor it into physics etc. 
They are just different and indispensable levels of description. Wittgenstein famously described 
it 80 years ago in the Blue Book. 
“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the method of science. 
I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible 
number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different 
topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the 
real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here 
that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy 
really is “purely descriptive.” 
He is also quite out of touch with the contemporary world, thinking that people are going to be 
nice because they have internalized altruism (i.e., group selection), and with demographic 
realities, when he opines that population growth is under control, when in fact predictions are 
for another 4 billion by 2100 (p133).  
He sees a need to “carve an academic niche for sociology” (p148), but the whole discussion is 
typical gibberish (no clear COS), and all one really needs (or can give) is a clear description of 
the language games (the mind at work) we play in social situations, and how they show how 
our attempts at inclusive fitness work or go astray in contemporary contexts. Over and over he 
pushes his fantasy that “inherently ethical behavior” (i.e., group selectionist altruism) explains 
our social behavior, ignoring the obvious facts that it’s due to temporary abundance of 
resources, police and surveillance, and that always when you take these away savagery quickly 
emerges (e.g., p151). It’s easy to maintain such delusions when one lives in the ivory tower 
world of abstruse theories, inattentive to the millions of scams, robberies, rapes, assaults, 
thefts and murders taking place every day.  
Again and again (e.g., top p170) he ignores the obvious explanations for our ‘rationality’, which 
is natural selection –i.e., inclusive fitness in the EEA leading to ESS (Evolutionarily Stable 
Strategies), or at least they were more or less stable in small groups 100,000 to 3 million years 
ago.  
Chapter 9 on the Sociology of the Genome is inevitably full of mistakes and incoherence—e.g., 
there are not special ‘altruistic genes’, rather, all genes serve inclusive fitness or they disappear 
(p188).  The problem is that the only way to really get selfish genetics and inclusive fitness 
across is to have Gintis in a room for a day with Dawkins, Franks, Coyne etc., explaining why it is 
wrong. But as always, one has to have a certain level of education, intelligence, rationality and 
honesty for this to work, and if one is just a little bit short in several categories, it will not 
succeed. The same of course is true for much of human understanding, and so the vast majority 
will never get anything that is at all subtle. As with the Nowak, Wilson,Tarnita paper, I am sure 
that Dawkins, Franks and others would have been willing to go over this chapter and explain 
where it goes astray, but wanton arrogance is an absolute barrier to truth.   
The major problem is that people just do not grasp the concept of natural selection by inclusive 
fitness nor of subconscious motivations, and that many have ‘religious’ motivations for 
rejecting them. This includes not just the general public and non-science academics, but a large 
percentage of biologists and behavioral scientists.  I recently came across a lovely review by 
Dawkins of a discussion of the selfish gene idea by top level professional biologists, in which he 
had to go over their work line by line to explain that they just did not grasp how it all works. But 
only a small number of people like him could do this, and the sea of confusion is vast, and so 
these delusions about human nature that destroy this book, and are destroying America and 
the world will, as the Queen said to Alice in a slightly different context, go on until they come to 
the end and then stop.  
 
 
 
 
 
